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The aim of this paper is to analyse patterns of private individual giving to Cultural 
Heritage institutions in Italy. Based on the emerging economic literature on pro-social 
behavior, we carried out a Contingent Valuation survey to assess individuals’ willingness 
to donate to museums and heritage organizations according to different conditions and set 
of incentives. Our findings reveal that intrinsic motivations and accountability of the 
recipient institutions may be more effective drivers for eliciting charitable giving than the 
usually proposed fiscal incentives. The results provide avenues for future empirical 
research and policy suggestions for fund raising cultural institutions.  
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The aim of this paper is to analyse the motivations behind individual giving for cultural 
heritage. Even if donations for culture generally rank low in the priorities of donors, 
they represent a crucial funding source in a context of general decrease of availability 
of resources to arts and culture. Hence, from a policy viewpoint, it becomes essential to 
find out the incentives and contexts that stimulate private giving. 
 
Yet, in the last decades the cultural policy agenda has mainly focused on tax policy. 
Lowering the price of giving follows a rational economic logic that assumes a negative 
relation between the monetary cost of giving and the supply of charitable acts by 
individuals.  
 
However, even economists have begun in the last decades to recognize and study the 
determinants of prosocial behavior other than the pure monetary and price incentives 
(i.e. Titmuss, 1974; Andreoni, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Frey, 1997; Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Pro-social motivations, such as 
altruism, moral codes of conduct and civic responsibility, may represent driving forces 
for engaging in the voluntarily contribution of collective goods. At the same time,   2
reputational concerns may substitute monetary incentives with social forms of 
compensation and equally generate virtous dynamics in prosocial behavior. These 
findings, have so far found little reflex in the cultural policy debate. 
 
In this paper we focus on the demand side of charitable giving in order to provide a 
more comprehensive framework of the determinants of private donations to cultural 
heritage and to assess their implications for cultural policy. We argue that in order to 
tailor more effective fundraising strategies for cultural heritage we need to address 
intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational motivations.  Based on this broader approach, we 
present the results of a recent contingent valuation survey carried out on a sample of 
Italian population to provide empirical evidence of voluntary donations and to 
investigate factors and conditions influencing individual giving to preserve cultural 
heritage. 
 
It is finally worth to notice that individual giving for charity is both a universal value 
driven by ethics and moral rules, and a phenomenon influenced by local culture and 
institutional factors. This means that every theory of giving must contain general 
explanations and take account of local cultural conditions. In this sense, the exploration 
of the Italian case is a contribution both to the general theory and to the influence of 
local contexts.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the main limitis of private 
individual donations as a funding strategy for arts and culture; Section 3 describes the 
general model of private donations; Section 4 gives details on the survey design and 




2. Individual giving to cultural heritage:  residual 
choice, misplaced emphasis 
Charitable giving to cultural heritage seems to suffer from two main drawbacks. The first 
one relates to the limited appeal of cultural heritage for attracting donations as compared 
to other sectors. The second is a misplaced emphasis in cultural policy, whereby 
introducing tax incentives seems to be the preferred mechanism of policymakers in 
search for easy fundraising and popularity.  
 
Among the different recipient sectors, private support to arts, culture and cultural heritage 
organizations ranks low in the amount of charitable donations. According to some rough 
estimate, internationally perhaps 10% of private philanthropy flows to culture (Inkei, 
2001). In United States, in 2007 out of 307 billion dollars, only 4,8% of the total amount 
has been directed to organizations in arts, culture and humanities (Giving Usa 
Foundation, 2008). In a similar vein, in Italy out of 5,5 billions euro of charitable giving 
estimated in 2007
1, arts and culture organizations ranks equally low as a recipient sector. 
For instance, recent surveys on donors’ behavior in Italy
2 reveal that the share of 
donations directed to arts, culture and cultural heritage institutions range between 1 to 
3,2%.  
                                                 
1 Il Sole 24ore, 24 dicembre 2007 
2 See i.e. Tomorrow SWG,  Il monitor delle donazioni, Milano, maggio 2007; Doxa, 
Comportamenti di donazione degli italiani, Roma, ottobre 2006   3
 
Donating for culture seems therefore a residual choice, coming behind other sectors such 
as religious organizations, health, education or human services. In the competitive market 
for charitable giving potential donors’ preferences are likely to be directed towards 
sectors for basic needs fulfillment rather than to the production of collective goods like 
arts and cultural heritage preservation. For instance, people may have more direct 
experience of health disease or feel a stronger personal sense of belonging to religious 
values. 
 
Moreover, it seems there has usually been a misplaced emphasis on fiscal incentives, 
which in contrast have failed in matching the set of unobservable priorities of potential 
donors in cultural activities. As noted by Schuster (2006), the main approach in the 
cultural policy agenda has centered in tax incentives to donors, as a measure to lower the 
price of giving and thus stimulate the voluntarily contribution of resources to the 
collective good. However, so far there has not been clear evidence that tax exemption-
based support policy has induced private donations to culture. First, the economic effect 
of tax incentives on donations is dubious, as some empirical studies show that giving is 
moderately price elastic while others inelastic (Steinberg, 2003). Second, from a policy-
making viewpoint, there is concern that the induced private contribution by fiscal 
incentive is far less than the foregone tax (Feld et. al., 1983). This is mainly because part 
of the total contribution provided under the tax incentives scheme would have been 
donated even without any fiscal support policy. 
 
Both the residual choice of donors and the misplaced emphasis in fiscal policies for 
donations ask for a reassessment of the analysis of individual motivations and 
institutional incentives that drive donors’ behavior. For the sake of our analysis we focus 
on Italy, because it is an appropriate example where donations to cultural heritage 
represent a residual choice and are affected by a misplaced emphasis in tax incentives as 
a way to stimulate them.  
The country is very rich of museums and heritage sites (more than 3500). Most of them 
are public institutions and the system is higly centralized leaving a modest financial 
autonomy to public museums. Further, public funds, both at the local and state level, are 
limited. Fundraising activity attracting donors is not fully developed, except for a tax 
rebate of 19% for the private contribution either to the acquisition, preservation and 
restoration of artworks and buildings or for the organization of art exhibitions.   
However, this fiscal scheme seems to not attract many contributors. For instance, the total 
collected funds in 2008 accounted for 20 millions Euros and only about 1% or 2% of 
donations trough this mechanism comes from individual giving
3.  
 
At the same time, voluntarily contributions in donation boxes at the entrance of museums 
are not implemented; neither membership nor other auxiliary services are fully used for 
collecting funds. Given the almost complete lack of individual giving to cultural heritage 
and the underdeveloped fundraising mechanisms, it is therefore interestenting to explore 
how novel fundraising strategies may be implemented starting from the potential donors’ 





                                                 
3 Data from the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage, 2005-2007, Rome   4
 
3. Motivations for giving to Cultural Heritage 
The preservation and valorization of cultural heritage is commonly seen as a public good 
and therefore private donations to cultural heritage represent a form of pro-social 
behavior to achieve that goal. Following the current literature on donations and 
philantropy (Andreoni, 2008; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; 
Vesterlund, 2006), we adopt a framework where agents’ pro-social behavior reflects an 




Intrinsic motivations are those arising from within the person. According to Deci (1975), 
a performed activity is driven by intrinsic motivations when one receives no apparent 
reward except the activity itself. Social psychologists and scientists have long recognized 
that joy of giving, moral codes of conduct and civicness may be driving forces for 
engaging in prosocial behavior such as the voluntarily contribution to collective goods 
(Batson 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). By contrast, standard economic theory has found more 
puzzling and challenging to understand why in many circumstances people act 
unselfishly without engaging in free riding behavior. 
Since 1970, Richard Titmuss (1970) showed that in specific transactions, namely blood 
donations, individual’s sense of civic duty is more effective than monetary rewards in 
providing higher blood quality and better supply. Albeit highly debated, this seminal 
insight provided one of the first contributions for introducing intrinsic motivations within 
the standard economic framework of human behavior.  
From an economic viewpoint, there can be three main possibilities to address the 
complex psychological process defining intrinsic motivation in private giving (Andreoni, 
1988). First, agents may care in a pure altruistic way about the overall level of public 
good to which their actions contribute. In this familiar public good provision model, 
intrinsic motivations reflect the individual willingness to contribute according to the 
preferences for the public good. A second possibility to frame intrinsic motivations is 
considering forms of impure altruism. For instance, agents may obtain some internal 
satisfaction – a “warm glow” - from the act of giving, in addition to what they care about 
the overall level of public good (Andreoni, 1990). Third, intrinsic motivations may also 
be taken into account by assuming moral constraints, ethical codes and principles of 
reciprocity or interdependent preferences of individuals (Sugden, 1984). 
Looking at individual donations to cultural heritage, a mix of the three explanations can 
be assumed to be the main source of intrinsic motivation. In summary, we expect the 
willingness to donate to cultural heritage is positively related to:  
-  the past cultural heritage consumption, whose addiction effect lowers the cost of 
accessing culture; the more the consumption, the highest are the direct benefits 
deriving from contributing to the preservation of cultural heritage; 
-  the willingness to enhance the existence and option values of cultural heritage at 
the advantage of both present and future generations; 
-  the extent an individual is affected by warm glow effect, which may be positively 
related to past experience of donations, as the experience of moral satisfaction in 
the past may induce people to replicate new acts of giving;   5
-  the sense of civicness and belonging to a community; the more an individual is 
embedded in a community that historically have practiced charitable giving the 
more may be willing to donate as a form of indirect gift and reciprocity. 
 
Extrinsic Motivations   
Extrinsic motivations refer to the set of economic incentives and conditions coming from 
outside the person. Individuals’ rational decision is in fact based on a cost-benefit 
assessment of their engagement in pro-social activity.  
The main class of extrinsic motivation is made of monetary rewards and other forms of 
economic incentives, such as tax rebates. The basic idea is that such forms of economic 
compensation lower the opportunity cost of engaging in prosocial behavior and thus 
increase the overall supply of contributions to cultural heritage.  
This argument follows the basic and strong assumption that extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations are independent and usually the formers reinforce the latter in acting 
prosocially. For this reason, the additional monetary compensation and tax rebate proposed 
by the policy makers are commonly assumed to increase the supply of donations. 
Yet it is necessary to understand which is the optimal level of monetary compensation that 
will make extrinsic incentives work. For instance, if individuals perceive a tax rebate too 
small, the opportunity cost of contributing still outweighs the sum of monetary rewards and 
potential benefits expected from the public good. In this case, the economic incentive is 
uneffective. 
Moreover, scholars have also reported in some circumstances phenomena of motivational 
crowding out, whereby extrinsic incentives, such as monetary compensation and rewards, 
may crowd out spontaneous prosocial acts, lowering the overall amount of contribution. 
For istance, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) report a field experiment where direct 
monetary compensation by the government reduced people’s acceptance of a noxius 
facility. The main explanation for this phenomenon is that monetary compensation 
generated a sort of bribe effect and crowded out the intrinsic sense of civic duty among 
citizens.  
In our knowledge, motivational crowding out of intrinsic motivations to donate by 
monetary compensation has never been documented in charitable giving and this possibility 
has still to be tested trough empirical evidence. 
 
Reputational Motivations 
Reputational motivations stem from the search for social recognition. In general, for 
cultural and historical reasons, giving to charitable organizations is viewed as a positive 
act in many societies. Therefore, beyond intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, donations 
may be driven by reputational concerns. For instance, Glazer and Konrad (1996) stress 
this point by presenting a model where the main driver for monetary giving is social 
signaling of status, such that donations by rich people substitute in specific cases the 
conspicuous comsumption of luxury private goods.  
In more general terms, reputational concerns for giving do not only raise for signaling 
social and wealth status, but simply for obtaining public praise, pursuit of distinction and 
image rewards. These factors depend more on social pressure and norms (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006).    6
Because acquiring reputation trough giving follows a social signaling motive, this 
behavior is ultimately affected by the visibility of the act. If the donation is anonymous or 
not easy to detect, then it is hard to gain reputation. As a consequence, anonymous 
donations are those considered the most valuable. Arguably, it is for this reason that 
charitable and non-profit institutions make ample use of donors’ desire to demonstrate 
their generosity and selflessness, with displays ranging from lapel pins and T-shirts to 
plaques in opera houses or museums and buildings named after large contributors. 
Furthermore, even if there exist mechanisms of visibility, reputational concerns work 
better if potential donors expect their action is visible by a clearly defined reference peer 
group. For instance, Glazer and Konrad (1996) report that the high level of non 
anonymous contributions to American universities made by alumni may also be caused 
by the desire to signal one’s status and obtain public praise by the group of former 
classmates.  
In the context of giving to cultural heritage and museums, affluent donors may be 
motivated to give in order to signal their own social status if mechanisms of publicity and 
visibility are available. However, it is not clear in this context if image motivation and the 
quest for public praise have an effect on medium and small contributors. Indeed, being 
enlisted in a public list of donors or similar mechanisms of ex-post publicity might not 




4. Survey design and implementation 
 
There is a growing empirical literature on patterns of charitable giving. From a 
methodological viewpoint, it is possibile to group empirical studies in three categories at 
least. In the first category there are studies which use data set of actual and past donations 
to charities in order to assess the determinants of private giving (Smith et al., 1995; 
Buraschi and Cornelli, 2002). In the second category there are studies which use 
laboratory and field experiments to test how people react in their giving practices 
according to different set of incentives and contexts, with a special emphasis on the 
effects of matching gifts on charitable giving (Karlan and List, 2007; Rondeau and List, 
2006; Landry et al., 2006). Finally, in the third category there are studies that employ 
contingent valuation survey to estimate donation, and investigate motives and attitudes 
behind this behavior (Santagata and Signorello, 2000; Thompson et al., 2002).  
In this paper we use contingent valuation for our empirical analysis. The main reason for 
analysing hypotetical donations instead of examine real donation data in Italy is due, as 
noted before, to the limited number of individual donations to cultural heritage.  
Contingent valuation surveys based on charitable donation might be not full demand 
revealing due to potential free-riding, and might run the risk of “hypothetical bias”. 
However, as Champ et al. (1997), and Champ and Bishop (2001) argued, donation 
vehicles are potentially more useful than is commonly recognized, especially in the field 
of cultural heritage. In fact, donation mechanisms offer practical advantages that may 
outweigh the drawback of potential free-riding: first, they can estimate an empirically 
testable lower bound on Hicksian surplus; second, they may be less subject to vehicle 
bias; third, donation mechanisms are more credible and more familiar than other 
mechanisms, as individuals normally have experience in donations; finally, as noted by 
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), when in surveys individuals are asked for the willingness 
to pay, their responses include the purchase of moral satisfaction for contributing to   7
public goods. The latter is known as a bias in the measurement of the willingness to pay 
through contingent valuation, but in the case of analyzing donations it is in line with pro-
social behavior based in intrinsic motivation. 
In order to collect the data a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) was 
implemented. Data collection took place from April to May 2009 by a specialized polling 
and market research company. A probabilistic stratified sample of 1000 individuals over 
25 who have visited at least one museum during the preceding 12 months was selected 
from telephone directories. The sample is representative of the Italian population of 
visitors to museums or heritage sites according to sex, age and geographic area.  
The questionnaire was designed following best practice guidelines, and comprised of 
three parts. The first part started by asking individual to choose within a list one museum 
or heritage site that she/he considers representative of the Italian cultural heritage in 
her/his local area. This variation across individuals in the good to be valued (or receiving 
donations) is the most signicant feature of our application respect to the common 
contingent valuation studies where only a good is valued.  
The first question was followed by a series of questions regarding individual experience 
on donations. The second part of the questionnaire included the contingent valuation 
scenarios and questions eliciting donations for each depicted scenario. In order to assess 
the role of different incentives for the donation to cultural heritage and museums, we 
constructed a simple framework articulated into two phases, as shown in Figure 1. In the 
first phase, respondents were asked to state their willingness to donate for selected 
cultural heritage institution in a neutral scenario. This would be considered as a form of 
pure prosocial behavior without any additional incentive. The answer to this question 
represent the baseline case for testing the effectiveness of additional incentives and 
contexts linked to the opportunity of giving. In the second phase, the individuals are 
asked if they would modify their stated amount facing three new independent scenarios, 
namely a) fiscal incentives (tax rebates), b) reputational incentives and c) transparency of 
the destination and efficient use of the funds donated. The same question is posed to 
those not willing to donate in the first phase in order to test if they are positively attracted 
by the changed conditions. All the questions concerning the three scenarios were 
randomized in each interview in order to avoid question order bias effects among the new 
scenarios. 
As far as tax incentives are concerned, the standard fiscal scheme has been proposed. 
Actually, in Italy, the law allows tax rebates for individual charitable donations at a level 
of 19% of the amount donated. It is important to notice that, because of the very scarce 
number of individual donors to cultural heritage applying for this tax rebate, we assume 
that this proposed scenario represents a completely new context at the respondents’ eyes 
as compared to the baseline neutral scenario.  
In our experimental setting, we proposed an additional scenario with 50% of fiscal 
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For the scenario of reputational incentives, recipient institutions would publicize 
donations trough mechanism of social signaling and visibility according to the amount 
given (a public list of donors, placing donors recognition plaques). 
Finally, the last scenario refers to the accountability in the management and destinations 
of the donations, such that donors would receive clear and detailed information about 
how and for which projects their money would be used. 
The repondents willingness to donate a lump sum for preserving and improving their 
selected heritage good was elicited using the interval open-ended format, recently 
proposed by Håkansson (2008). In the interval open-ended elicitation format, respondents 
state their willingness to donate in the form of an interval rather than a point estimate as 
in traditional open–ended format. In this way, it is possible to capture potential donation 
uncertainty, more information about individuals’ preferences, and identify upper and 
lower boundary of estimates. 
Further, respondents were asked a series of follow up questions to identify the motives 
for donating or not to the good they choose and to inquire about preferred modes of 
donation. 









                                                 
4 Questions on gender and age were posed at the beginning of the interview in order to  
fit sampling criteria.   9
Table 1 - Description and value of the sample socio-economic variables 
Variables Description  Mean  S.D. 
Sex Male=1  Female=0  0,43  0,495 
Age  Categorical Variable:1(25-44 
years), 2(45-64), 3 (65+)  1,89 0,706 
North  Residents in North Italy=1 
Other=0  0,46 0,499 
Centre  Residents in Centre Italy=1 
Other=0  0,2 0,4 
Education  Years of education  14,04  3,352 
Job Employed=1  Other=0  0,58  0,494 
Visits 
Number of Visits to Museums 
and Heritage sites in the last 12 
months 
3,03 1,625 
PastDonation  Having donated in the past 3 
years Yes=1 No =0  0,77 0,422 
Numpastdon  Number of donations in the past 
three years  2,84 1,91 
DonCulture  Having donated to Arts and 
Culture Institutions=1 Other=0  0,04 0,205 
Heritage 
Importance 
Importance of Cultural Heritage 
conservation for the respondent 
1=low to 3= high 
2,85 0,369 
Visits  Number of visits to museums in 
the past 12 months  3,03 1,625 
Voluntary 
Organization 
Belonging to Voluntary 
Organizations Yes=1 No=0  0,34 0,473 
ValuePastDon 
Highest amount donated in the 




Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the sample. As can be noted, the number of 
people engaged in prosocial activities is relevant. A great majority of the respondents 
(77%) has made on average 2,84 donations in the last three years and the highest amount 
donated is on average 100 Euros. However, as expected, a small number of respondents 
(4%) have donated to cultural organizations. Further, 34% of the sample belongs to a 
voluntary organization. Further, respondents consider the conservation of cultural 
heritage a relevant issue. This result may be partly explained by the fact that the 
respondents are interested in cultural heritage having been chosen among those who 
visited a cultural site at least once in the past year. For instance, the average number of 
visits to museums is about three times a year. 
 
5. Results 
Intrinsic motivations and contributions to cultural heritage 
The 32,7% of the respondents, 327 out of 1000 individuals, was willing to donate for a 
leading Italian museum or heritage site located in the region of residence. The average   10
donation is € 70,81 with a median of € 30, a minimum of € 1 and a maximum of € 2000
5. 
This result comes out from the basic scenario in which individuals are supposed to 
behave following exclusively intrinsic motivations, that is without any explicit form of 
incentives or other potential benefits. 
A first glimpse at the distribution of the amounts donated (Figure 2) shows two peaks, 
respectively around 10-20 € and 50-100 €. This suggests the existence of two main 
classes of contributors. The former is characterized by small amounts, typical of those 
who spontaneously give in donation boxes at the entrance to museums when either or not 
an entrance fee is charged. Its main trait is likely to correspond to the use value for the 
consumer. The latter class is more likely to patronage behaviour aimed to the realization 
of passive use values of cultural heritage: existence, option, and intergenerational value. 
 




Further, Table 2 presents the number of contributors and the amount declared according 
to the main socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. Women are more likely to 
contribute than men and donate a greater amount. Occupied respondents have a higher 
propensity to donate and contribute a larger amount of money than unoccupied 
individuals. As for the age of donors, data show that young people are more willing to 
donate to cultural heritage. Nevertheless, the average amount increases with the age of 
donors. Similarly, there are relatively more donors from the South of Italy, but the 
amount per donor is sensibly less than that donated by contributors from North and 
Centre Italy. Educational level of donors positively affects both the propensity to 






                                                 
5 Troughout the analysis and the in econometric estimates we use only the upper bound of the 
monetary interval stated by the respondents.   11







Sex       
Male 126  29,23%  63,37  94,71 
Female 201  35,33%  75,47  200,85 
              
Region       
North 138  29,74%  78,2  200,843 
Centre 59  29,50%  77,14  155,17 
South 130  38,69%  60,08  132,17 
              
Job       
Unoccupied 124  29,59%  64,17  114,689 
Occupied 203  34,94%  74,86  193,64 
              
Age       
25-44 126  40,78%  53,5  125,53 
45-64 146  29,80%  68,71  136,21 
65+ 55  27,36%  116,02  285,13 
              
Education       
Low School  34  25,00%  27,74  28,39 
Undergraduated 141 29,50% 63,8  146,05 
Graduated 152  39,38%  86,94  200,64 
              
Total Sample  327 100%  70,81  168 
 
 
Within the group of donors, additional questions in the survey reveal that anounymous 
mechanisms6 of donations account for 61% of donors. One explanation for this evidence 
may be that the majority of pure prosocial donors prefer not to reveal their identity. 
Another possibility is that the choice of anonymous mechanisms of donation is related to 
smaller amounts of contribution. In our case, while we cannot test the first hyphotesis, for 
the latter the correlation between the amount donated and the mechanism of publicity is 
positive (ρ = 0,241) and significant at 0,01% level.  
Further, it can be noted that 78% of the donors’ sample is motivated by passive use 
values of cultural heritage (existence, intergenerational and option values), 17% is 
motivated by use-value reasons (i.e. improving the quality of visitors’ services, acquiring 
new artworks), while only a small fraction (1%) expressely justify its contribution with 
the “joy of giving”. These results confirm that the main intrinsic motivational drivers are 
not directly connected with the direct use of cultural good, but with preferences for the 
public good characteristics of cultural heritage. 
                                                 
6 For anonymous mechanisms of donations we adopt the criterium of traceability of 
donors’ contribution. Anonimous mechanisms we proposed are: 1) in a donation box and 
2) through sms messages. Non anonymous methods we proposed are 1) bank and postal 
transfers and 2) membership and patronage schemes.    12
As for the non-donors, we explore the motivation of their refusal. The majority (47%) of 
those not willing to contribute to cultural heritage declare they have priorities for 
contributions in other charitable sectors and 25 % state that it is unfair to contribute 
beyond the public support.  
In order to better analyse the determinants of donations due to individuals’ intrinsic 
motivations we run a 2 steps model (Heckman, 1979) where we test the significance of 
the main characteristics of the respondents. This involves estimating a probit model of the 
form  
 
Gi = βZi + ui          ( 1 )  
 
in the first step, where Gi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent makes a 
donation and 0 otherwise. In the second step the regression 
 
(Amount |Gi > 0) = γXi +θλi + ei       ( 2 )  
 
is estimated using a two-stage least squares, where γ is a vector of coefficients, θ is a 
scalar coefficient and λi is the Heckman correction term (inverse Mills ratio) required for 
consistent estimation. As for the explanatory variables, the same socio-demographic 
variables have been used in both stages to test the propensity to donate and the amount 
contributed. However, taking into account past experience of donations we expect that 
the dummies PastDonation and DonCulture are more likely to affect only the decision to 
donate at all, while the highest stated amount donated in the past (ValuePastDon) is 
expected to affect the second stage of the model. 
The econometric estimates (Table 3) confirm the expected results on donors’ behavior 
based on intrinsic motivations. First, individual education increases the probability to 
donate and the amount contributed. Educational level is indeed usually considered as a 
proxy variable for cultural consumption, which in turn determines a greater consideration 
for culture and cultural heritage. Second, past experiences of giving - and especially 
donation to culture and arts organizations - matter in determining the willingness to 
donate. However, the level of past contributions seems to not affect the amount donated. 
Third, the greater is the importance given by respondents to the conservation of cultural 
heritage the higher is the probability to donate and the larger is amount contributed. 
 
   











    Table 3 – 2 Steps Heckman model   13
 
      Parameter Estimates 
     Sample size      
     N=1000    N=327 
             
Variables    Step 1    Step 2 
        
Dependent 
Variable   
Willingness to donate 
Yes=1 No=0   
Amount 
contributed 
           
Constant   -1,804***   -559,77** 
     (-4,26)    (-3,03) 
Age   -0,211**    4,91 
     (-3,13)    (0,26) 
Sex   -0,080    -30,68 
     (-0,91)    (-1,31) 
North   -0,204**    -15,231 
     (-2,13)    (-0,57) 
Centre   -0,216*    -18,105 
     (-1,80)    (-0.54) 
Job   -0,045    19,302 
     (-0,46)    (0,80) 
Education   0,032**    8,78** 
     (2,27)    (2,27) 
DonCulture   0,545**    - 
     (2,73)      
PastDonations   0,398**    - 
     (3,69)      
Importance   0,376**    88,87** 
     (2,86)    (2,07) 
Voluntary Organization  -0,077    - 
     (-0,85)      
Visits   -0,33   8,435 
     (1,18)    (0,25) 
ValuePastDon       0,02 
         (1,46) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio      206,47** 
         (2,76) 
             
Log Likelihood    -597,17    -2120,4 
McFadden Pseudo R2  0,055      
Adjusted R-squared      0,0047 
Chi-squared   69,72    37,18 
t-ratios in parentheses 
* significant at α=0,10 
** significant fat α=0,05 







The role of extrinsic and reputational motivations   14
The second step of the analysis deals with the additional effect of extrinsic and 
reputational incentives on the donation choice expressed by the individuals. In order to 
have a comprehensive and simultaneous understanding of the characteristics of the 
respondents and to understand how the individuals are attracted by different incentives, 
we identified a variable representing the most significant choice of donation for each 
individual among the different scenarios, namely pure prosocial behavior, fiscal incentive 
(tax rebates 19%) and reputational mechanism. In other words, when the individual 
willingness to donate is positive for two or more scenarios, the highest willingness to 
donate will be taken as representative of the best choice. Consequently, the respondent 
can be classified according to the following choices: being a non-donor, a pure prosocial 
donor (reacting just to intrinsic motivations) and a donor reacting either to reputational 
incentives or monetary compensation (tax rabates 19%). Table 4 illustrates the 
descriptive statistics of the four options.  
 
 
Table 4 – Donors’ behavior according to the best choice variable 
CHOICE  Mean 





Pure Prosocial   71,96  260  0/260  18.709 
Reputational 
Incentives  330,03  36  10/36  11.880 
Fiscal Incentives 
19%  68,89  92  51/92  6.338 
No Donation  0  612  612/612  0 
 
One of the most evident results is that 260 individuals are pure prosocial donors and their 
average donation is 71,96 €. This means that about 80% (260 out of 327) of those who 
were initially willing to contribute has not accepted to change his amount according to 
new incentives. 
Only 92 respondents have chosen monetary compensation as the most significative 
choice in terms of amount donated, while those who reacted most to reputational 
incentives are just 36. The intronduction of new incentives (fiscal rebate at 19% and 
reputational mechanisms) attracts as well contributors from those initially stating their 
non-willingess to donate. In general, the amount of new contributors generated by 
monetary and reputational incentives is respectively 8,2% and 1,5% of the initial non-
donors. 
Looking at the average amount donated by the different classes of donors two 
considerations are at stake. First, the donors responding to reputational incentives 
contribute the highest amount, equal to an average of 330,03 €. Second, the average 
donation by those reacting most to monetary compensation is the lowest one and in 
particular below the average amount donated by the pure prosocial group. Arguably, this 
latter result is due to the fact that a large number of donors reacting most to the tax rebate 
were initial non-donors and their willingness to donate stimulated by the fiscal incentive 
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After the analysis of the standard incentives to donate we consider two additional 
scenarios to better understand the role of fiscal incentives and accountability affecting the 
willingness to donate. 
 
Table 5 – Donors behavior according to the best choice variable with new contexts 
CHOICE  Mean  Total Donors 
% Initial Non 





No Donation  0  473  100% 0 
Fiscal 
Incentives 19%  68,12  32  56,25% 2.180 
Fiscal 
Incentives 50%  146,4  166  36,75% 24.302 
Reputational 
Incentives  542,62  16  31,25% 8.682 
Transparency/ 
Accountability  123,48  191  60,73% 23.585 
Pure Prosocial  60,16  122  0,00% 7.340 
 
Table 5 shows how the patterns of donors’ behavior change according to the old and new 
proposed scenarios. 
Adding two new conditions has many effects on the structure of donors’ choices. The two 
added scenarios are clearly appealing, collecting 166 preferences for fiscal incentives at 
50% and 191 preferences for more transparency and accountability.  
As a consequence, the number of initial non-donors decreases from 627 to 473. At the 
same time, almost half of pure prosocial donors have moved to the new scenarios, 
attracted by the new favourable conditions. In any case, pure prosocial donors still 
represent a good share of the total donors: they are 122 and the average amount they 
stated to donate is 60,16 € 
Moreover, considering monetary compensation, fiscal incentives at 19% are not any more 
attractive. The new fiscal scheme at 50% accounts for 83% of all those respondents who 
express fiscal incentive as the best choice for donation. Reputational incentives confirm 
their elitarian profile with a small group of 16 people but with the highest average of 
contribution (542,62€). The condition for transparency and accountability provides the 
most interesting result, especially for the Italian case where the citizens’ trust on 
institutions is generally low (Eurobarometer, 2009). Crucially, 191 individuals have 
chosen this possibility with an average donation of 123,48€. Transparency and 
accountability conditions are also the main attractors of initial non-donors as compared to 
other scenarios. Crucially, we suggest interpreting this result as a form of crowding-in of 
latent pro-social donors. Transparency and accountability conditions do not expressely 
represent an incentive for giving, such as fiscal or reputational mechanisms, but can 
nevertheless increase the return of pro-social actions by donors moved by intrinsic 
motivations. In this context, the lack of transparency and accountability of recipient 
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6. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper explored three main issues. The first was whether or not there is room for 
donations to cultural heritage moved simply by intrinsic motivations and what are the 
main socio-economic determinants of such pure prosocial behavior. The second issue was 
the role of extrinsic and reputational incentives in enhancing contribution to cultural 
heritage. Finally, the third issue aimed to provide some insights in new contexts and 
conditions that can affect donors’ behavior, namely the level of monetary compensation 
and the issue of accountability of the recipient institution. 
The main empirical results of the survey reveal the strategic role of intrinsic motivations 
as the principal determinants of the choice to giving. Taking into account the contexts of 
choice, the accountability undoubtedly appears to be the key circumstance fitting with the 
greater mobilization of latent donors and is able to enhance giving for culture in Italy. 
Furthermore the results show some significant suggestions for the contemporary policy 
making. The current political debate concerning private donations to culture and cultural 
heritage has mainly focused on fiscal incentives. This research however suggests decision 
makers should count on a more elaborate and comprehensive framework of incentives. 
First, in order to strengthen intrinsic motivations (civicness, universal value of cultural 
heritage, ethic motivations) medium and long-term policies are at stake. Such policies 
should be mainly directed to the educational system, the enhancement of cultural 
consumption habits and to collective events like “Telethon” or awareness campaigns, 
which increase the attention to cultural heritage preservation. Similarly, new strategies 
should be developed to enhance the accountability of recipient institutions in order to 
increase the confidence of pro-social donors. 
Second, because patronage behavior refers to small group of donors but can still play a 
relevant role in funding cultural heritage, new niche policies can be proposed to foster 
publicity mechanisms of great donors. This is particularly relevant in Italy where there is 
generally lack of these mechanisms for individual donors.   
Finally, standard fiscal policies do not seem very effective in enhancing donations, unless 
trough an exceptional increase of the tax rebate. This points out the necessity for policy-
makers to find appropriate and minimal tax rebate levels which maximize the number of 
people willing to contribute or to increase their donation above that given trough intrinsic 
motivation. However, increasing fiscal incentives seems hard to be realized mainly 
because of the high costs in foregone taxes and because of the immoderate importance 
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